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Since 2012, Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) coro-
navirus has infected 2,442 persons worldwide. Case-based 
data analysis suggests that since 2016, as many as 1,465 
cases and 293–520 deaths might have been averted. Efforts 
to reduce the global MERS threat are working, but countries 
must maintain vigilance to prevent further infections.
From 2012 through May 31, 2019, Middle East respira-tory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) has infected 
2,442 persons and killed 842 worldwide (1). MERS-CoV 
is currently circulating in dromedary camels in Africa, the 
Middle East, and southern Asia; however, most cases of 
human infection have been reported in the Arabian Pen-
insula (2). Large hospital outbreaks in 2014 and 2015 
(3,4) (Appendix Figure 1, https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/EID/
article/25/9/19-0143-F1.htm) motivated affected countries 
to substantially invest in prevention and control activities. 
To estimate the potential number of MERS cases and 
deaths that might have been averted since 2016 had the risk 
levels of 2014–2015 continued, we analyzed case-based 
data on laboratory-confirmed human cases of MERS-CoV 
infections reported to the World Health Organization (5). 
We categorized cases as either secondary (human-to-human 
transmission) or community-acquired (presumed camel-to-
human transmission). In addition, we used case-based data 
on date of onset (for symptomatic infections) or report (for 
asymptomatic infections), outcome (died/recovered), and 
dates and sizes of reported clusters of human-to-human–
transmission cases (3,4,6–8).
We compared incidence of camel-to-human–transmis-
sion  cases (i.e., community-acquired cases, assuming all 
of those not positively attributed to human-to-human trans-
mission were in this category) during 2016, 2017, and 2018 
(through September only) with incidence during 2014–
2015, assuming that case numbers were Poisson distributed 
(yielding a 2-sided p value). Furthermore, we obtained the 
expected total number of cases in 2016, 2017, and through 
September 2018, conditional on the incidence of commu-
nity-acquired cases, by simulating 10,000 times from the 
distribution of human-to-human–transmission cluster sizes 
observed during 2014–2015. Thus, the observed incidence 
rates in these years could be compared with simulations 
to test the null hypothesis that human-to-human transmis-
sion levels remained constant since 2014–2015 (yielding a 
2-sided p value). The intervals reported are the 2.5th and 
97.5th percentiles of the simulations (95% CIs). We exam-
ined a range of mortality rates from healthcare-associated 
outbreaks in South Korea and Saudi Arabia (3,5) and the 
case-fatality ratio (CFR) from all reported cases globally 
(35.5%, 800 fatalities/2,254 cases) (9). When numbers of 
cases averted were not statistically significant, we truncated 
the lower bound of the 95% CI to 0 cases averted.
Of the 2,254 laboratory-confirmed cases reported to the 
World Health Organization from 2012 through October 1, 
2018 (Appendix Figure 1), 1,087 were classified as human-
to-human transmssion cases and the remaining 1,167 as 
community-acquired cases. During this same period, clus-
ters/outbreaks were reported each year (range 2–255 cases).
Although 739 cases were reported in 2014 and 768 
cases in 2015, only 244 cases were reported in 2016, an-
other 244 in 2017, and 113 through September 2018. We 
assessed potential components of this reduction (i.e., re-
duction of community-acquired cases, human-to-human 
transmission cases, or both). The incidence of communi-
ty-acquired cases was 177 in 2016, 151 in 2017, and 86 
through September 2018 (Appendix Table). These rates 
were each significantly (p<0.001) lower than expected 
compared with the incidence in 2014–2015 (334 for 2016, 
334 for 2017, and 251 through September 2018). Condi-
tional on the number of community-acquired cases, we 
observed no significant reduction in the risk for secondary 
cases from 2014–2015 to 2016, 2017, and through Septem-
ber 2018, although we did find nonsignificant trends. We 
estimated that 154 secondary cases (95% CI 0–495) were 
averted from the 177 community-acquired cases in 2016, 
96 (95% CI 0–419) from the 151 community-acquired 
cases in 2017, and 80 (95% CI 0–338) from the 86 com-
munity-acquired cases through September 2018, totaling 
330 (95% CI 0–819) from the 414 community-acquired 
cases during 2016–September 2018 (Table). Assuming a 
20% CFR (3,10), these 330 (95% CI 0–819) cases averted 
correspond to 66 (95% CI 0–164) expected deaths averted; 
assuming a 35.5% CFR (9), they correspond to 117 (95% 
CI 0–291) expected deaths averted.
The total number of cases averted, when simultane-
ously taking into account reduced camel-to-human and 
human-to-human transmission, was estimated at 507 (95% 
CI 189–967) in 2016, 507 (95% CI 189–967) in 2017, and 
451 (95% CI 191–855) through September 2018, totaling 
1,465 (95% CI 895–2,165) cases averted and 293 (95% CI 
179–433) expected deaths averted (under the assumption of 
a 20% CFR) from 2016 through September 2018. Assum-
ing a 35.5% CFR, this estimate corresponds to 520 (95% CI 
318–769) expected deaths averted.
We believe that affected countries are reducing the 
global threat of MERS by addressing knowledge gaps 
with regard to transmission, enhancing surveillance, and 
strengthening the ability to detect cases early and con-
tain outbreaks through improved infection prevention and 
control measures in hospitals. Critical for preventing in-
ternational spread and sustained transmission have been 
improved prevention and control measures in hospitals, re-
striction of camel movement in affected areas, stronger and 
more comprehensive investigations of cases and clusters, 
and improved communication.
Although global efforts seem to have prevented hun-
dreds of infections and deaths, vigilance must be main-
tained by all countries. More needs to be done to limit spill-
over infections from dromedaries, which requires stronger 
surveillance of dromedary populations and persons in direct 
contact with infected herds and accelerated development 
of a vaccine for dromedaries (2). The international com-
munity and affected countries have a collective and shared 
responsibility to curtail a major health security threat such 
as MERS in the Middle East and beyond.
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Table. Estimated Middle East respiratory syndrome cases and deaths averted because of reduced human-to-human transmission and 
camel-to-human transmission* 
Year 
Estimated cases and deaths averted because of 
reduced human-to-human transmission† 
 
Estimated cases and deaths averted because of reduced 
camel-to-human and human-to-human transmission 
Cases 
averted‡ 
2-sided 
p value 
Deaths averted 
Cases averted‡ 
2-sided 
p value 
Deaths averted 
Assuming 
20% CFR‡ 
Assuming 
35.5% CFR‡ 
Assuming 
20% CFR‡ 
Assuming 
35.5% CFR‡ 
2016 154 (0–495) 0.2714 31 (0–99) 55 (0–176)  507 (189–967) <0.0001 101 (38–193) 180 (67–343) 
2017 96 (0–419) 0.5810 19 (0–84) 34 (0–149)  507 (189–967) <0.0001 101 (38–193) 180 (67–343) 
2018§ 80 (0–338) 0.4316 16 (0–68) 29 (0–120)  451 (191–855) <0.0001 90 (38–171) 160 (68–304) 
2016–2018§ 330 (0–819) 0.0896 66 (0–164) 117 (0–291)  1,465 (895–2165) <0.0001 293 (179–433) 520 (318–769) 
*Values are estimated no. (95% range) except as indicated. CFR, case-fatality ratio. 
†Conditional on reported community-acquired cases. 
‡The 95% intervals reported are the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles of the simulations. When cases averted were not statistically significant, we truncated 
the lower bound of the 95% CI to 0 cases averted. 
§Through September 2018. 
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Resistance to second-line tuberculosis drugs for patients 
with multidrug-resistant tuberculosis has emerged globally 
and is a potential risk factor for unfavorable outcomes of 
shorter duration drug regimens. We assessed the propor-
tion of patients eligible for a shorter drug regimen in Uttar 
Pradesh, India, which had the highest rate of multidrug-re-
sistant tuberculosis in India.
India has the largest burden of multidrug-resistant (MDR) tuberculosis (TB) worldwide (1). The success rate for 
MDR TB treatment is low (47%), largely caused by death, 
suboptimal adherence of patients to long treatment courses, 
and frequent drug-related adverse events (2).
In 2016, the World Health Organization recommended 
a shorter drug regimen (9–12 months) for patients with 
MDR TB or rifampin-resistant TB who had not received 
second-line drugs (SLDs) and in whom resistance to fluo-
roquinolones and injectable SLDs is considered highly 
unlikely (3). A shorter regimen is a promising step toward 
high treatment success rates. Recently, this regimen was 
instituted in Uttar Pradesh, which has ≈20% of the total 
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